July 17, 1935--Tragedy in Van Lear
Written by Bill Kretzer, grandson of Charles H. Kretzer
Coal mining was dirty, back breaking work (abt 1938)
Van Lear, Kentucky was the quintessential company town. It's very existence is owed to Consolidated Coal Company, the mining company that built (with the help of Van Lear Black, the town's namesake, and rich Maryland businessman) a spur of the Chesapeake and Ohio railroad to the city, and ran the five coal mines in Van Lear. The town was incorporated in 1912 to house and service the men who worked for the company. During it's peak, there were 4,000 residents, more than the county seat, Paintsville, nearby. But, on July 17, 1935 a single event would not only change life as it was known, but would signal the end of an era.
Mine #155 was a coal mine much like a hundred others in the Appalachian region. Certainly it was much like the other four mines in Van Lear. The miners were extracting bituminous coal, of very high quality, from the Miller's Creek Seam #1. It was mined using the "Room and Pillar" method. That meant that instead of just going and taking all of the coal out, they would mine in a pattern that left large, wide, "pillars" of coal that would continue to hold up the roof. If you looked at it from above it would closely resemble a city streetscape. The streets would be the mined areas, and the lots would be the pillars of coal left for support. The rooms would have been about 20-30 ft wide and the pillars somewhere around 100 feet wide. This method works well, but it is inevitable that the floor and the ceiling will meet. Either intentionally, by mining the pillars causing a cave in, or through the natural process of physics, where pressure, crust shift, and the build up gas will cause the floor to "heave" (move up) and the ceiling to fall (cave in).
One of the reasons that a floor could heave is the pressure caused by the buildup of methane gas. Methane gas is a well known hazard of coal mining. In high enough concentrations it can explode with no more than a spark to set it off. There are strict rules governing, even in 1935, the amount of methane gas that can be in a work area. To minimize the risk of explosion that level is monitored and regulated. While you can not control the amount of gas that Mother Nature chooses to release in the mine, you can control the amount of fresh air that is pumped into an area. When methane is detected the air flow is increased, and the ratio of methane to oxygen would be reduced to a point where a crew could safely work. Samples of air are taken and analyzed to monitor methane levels.
Mine #155 was a coal mine much like a hundred others in the Appalachian region. Certainly it was much like the other four mines in Van Lear. The miners were extracting bituminous coal, of very high quality, from the Miller's Creek Seam #1. It was mined using the "Room and Pillar" method. That meant that instead of just going and taking all of the coal out, they would mine in a pattern that left large, wide, "pillars" of coal that would continue to hold up the roof. If you looked at it from above it would closely resemble a city streetscape. The streets would be the mined areas, and the lots would be the pillars of coal left for support. The rooms would have been about 20-30 ft wide and the pillars somewhere around 100 feet wide. This method works well, but it is inevitable that the floor and the ceiling will meet. Either intentionally, by mining the pillars causing a cave in, or through the natural process of physics, where pressure, crust shift, and the build up gas will cause the floor to "heave" (move up) and the ceiling to fall (cave in).
One of the reasons that a floor could heave is the pressure caused by the buildup of methane gas. Methane gas is a well known hazard of coal mining. In high enough concentrations it can explode with no more than a spark to set it off. There are strict rules governing, even in 1935, the amount of methane gas that can be in a work area. To minimize the risk of explosion that level is monitored and regulated. While you can not control the amount of gas that Mother Nature chooses to release in the mine, you can control the amount of fresh air that is pumped into an area. When methane is detected the air flow is increased, and the ratio of methane to oxygen would be reduced to a point where a crew could safely work. Samples of air are taken and analyzed to monitor methane levels.
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Coal miner working the face of a coal seam
Some time in early July 1935 the floor in an area of #155 began to heave. Around the 13th of July, the rate at which the floor would rise had begun to increase. Air samples taken on July 7th and 8th had shown the presence of methane in a section of the mine, but not where the men would be working. A sample taken on the 12th had not found any methane. No further samples were taken until the 20th. It was the policy, at the time, to only take air samples in areas of the mine that were being worked, and only on the days that the mine was worked. Technically, this section of the mine was abandoned and not being worked.
The heaving of the floor was weakening timbers and causing all manner of damage to the cave support system. It was also presenting problems for ventilation. To ventilate an area two miles away (which was the distance from the mine entrance to where the event would occur) you must have a clear airway, with few open areas. Picture a blowing fan sitting in the front of your living room. The farther you are away from the fan, the less you feel the breeze. That is because the fan is trying to blow air over a wide and tall area. Put the same fan in a hallway, and you can feel the breeze much farther away. That is because the fan does not have to push the air over such a wide area. It is the same with a coal mine, the air has to flow through the "hallways" and the doors to the various parts of the mine, that aren't being worked, need to be closed. The heaving of the floor interrupted airflow by opening areas that were supposed to be closed, and more importantly making the "hallway" ceiling much lower. This did not allow fresh air to get in, or the methane to get out.
So Wednesday, July 17th, you had an area of Mine #155 in which there was a potential for increased methane level, decreased ventilation, and no methane level measurement. Add to this mixture, a dozen men and equipment, and you have conditions that are at best questionable and at worst dangerous. The worst was coming.
Those dozen men, Virgil Clay (21), Roy Murray (38) , Jim Vaughan (52), John Gool (56), Derwood Litz (34), Frank Tuzzy (43), Sherley Hereford (38), Stanley Crane (fire boss), Irvin Mullins (Engineer, with Mr. Crane), Anse Wilson (42), Charles Kretzer (45) and his brother and section foreman, William Kretzer (41) all had jobs to do. Work at the mine was slow, so nine of them were pretty happy to be there. Those men had been assigned to remove track and equipment from the section of the mine that was heaving. This work is done to recover company assets (mostly the track) before they are destroyed or otherwise made unattainable. Three men, Stanley Crane, Irvin Mullins, and Anse Wilson were not working in the heaved section. It was not reported exactly what they were doing, but their job titles suggest that they were inspecting for damage and accessing where else they were going to have to deploy track removal crews. Or perhaps they were just accessing where to designate future mine teams. It really isn't important. What was important happened in a flash.
The heaving of the floor was weakening timbers and causing all manner of damage to the cave support system. It was also presenting problems for ventilation. To ventilate an area two miles away (which was the distance from the mine entrance to where the event would occur) you must have a clear airway, with few open areas. Picture a blowing fan sitting in the front of your living room. The farther you are away from the fan, the less you feel the breeze. That is because the fan is trying to blow air over a wide and tall area. Put the same fan in a hallway, and you can feel the breeze much farther away. That is because the fan does not have to push the air over such a wide area. It is the same with a coal mine, the air has to flow through the "hallways" and the doors to the various parts of the mine, that aren't being worked, need to be closed. The heaving of the floor interrupted airflow by opening areas that were supposed to be closed, and more importantly making the "hallway" ceiling much lower. This did not allow fresh air to get in, or the methane to get out.
So Wednesday, July 17th, you had an area of Mine #155 in which there was a potential for increased methane level, decreased ventilation, and no methane level measurement. Add to this mixture, a dozen men and equipment, and you have conditions that are at best questionable and at worst dangerous. The worst was coming.
Those dozen men, Virgil Clay (21), Roy Murray (38) , Jim Vaughan (52), John Gool (56), Derwood Litz (34), Frank Tuzzy (43), Sherley Hereford (38), Stanley Crane (fire boss), Irvin Mullins (Engineer, with Mr. Crane), Anse Wilson (42), Charles Kretzer (45) and his brother and section foreman, William Kretzer (41) all had jobs to do. Work at the mine was slow, so nine of them were pretty happy to be there. Those men had been assigned to remove track and equipment from the section of the mine that was heaving. This work is done to recover company assets (mostly the track) before they are destroyed or otherwise made unattainable. Three men, Stanley Crane, Irvin Mullins, and Anse Wilson were not working in the heaved section. It was not reported exactly what they were doing, but their job titles suggest that they were inspecting for damage and accessing where else they were going to have to deploy track removal crews. Or perhaps they were just accessing where to designate future mine teams. It really isn't important. What was important happened in a flash.
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The tipple at mine #155 as it looked in July 1935
The men had been working but a short time, when at 8:40 AM, a spark, probably from a Fairmont pump being used to drain water, ignited a build up (possibly from a very recently liberated pocket) of methane gas and there was an explosion. On the surface people heard the rumble, and some felt a shutter. Most had no idea what it meant, but one of the men in the mine made his way to a phone. Soon the whole town had forgotten about the morning chores and were on their way to check on their friends and loved ones. The town wouldn't know, positively, for another 52 hours, but down in the mine, it was all over. The force of the blast and the falling shale from the ceiling had killed all nine who were working to remove track. The three other men had been knocked down by the concussion, and two, including Crane were hurt. But all three working away from the explosion made it out. On the surface, however, nothing was known about the condition of the other nine who had been removing track. Word was immediately sent out asking for help. Rescue workers from near, and as far as Norton, VA, were soon on the scene. The Norton people who had the rescue equipment from the Norton Safety Station were among the last to arrive, at 2:50 PM.
Rescue teams were quickly organized by Division Manager B.M Rogers, and William Gunning, Mine Superintendent. The explosion, in addition to starting a fire had made the normal route into the area unsafe. There were numerous ceiling falls (cave-ins) and due to the raging fire, it was deemed dangerous to send fresh, oxygenated, air to fuel the fire. So instead of pumping air into the mine as normal, the amount air allowed into the explosion area was limited. This they hoped would cause the fire to die down.
The heat from the fire, the smoke, the dangerous ceiling, the blocked passages, and the lack of oxygen conspired to drive the initial rescue team back. But it was absolutely necessary to get a team where the explosion had occurred. This was the only way the status of the men could be determined. The normal man-way was not an option due to the fire, numerous roof falls and fallen supports. It was decided that entrance would be gained by erecting line brattices (dividing curtains that split a passage into two halves), down a different series of tunnels. One side of the line brattice is used for fresh air, the other for the return air. Men and equipment could then travel down one side as well. This was a slow process. You had to send men with oxygen tanks forward to determine how far it was safe (no fire) to erect line brattice, then actually erect the structure and strengthen or replace damaged support beams and timbers.
Rescue teams were quickly organized by Division Manager B.M Rogers, and William Gunning, Mine Superintendent. The explosion, in addition to starting a fire had made the normal route into the area unsafe. There were numerous ceiling falls (cave-ins) and due to the raging fire, it was deemed dangerous to send fresh, oxygenated, air to fuel the fire. So instead of pumping air into the mine as normal, the amount air allowed into the explosion area was limited. This they hoped would cause the fire to die down.
The heat from the fire, the smoke, the dangerous ceiling, the blocked passages, and the lack of oxygen conspired to drive the initial rescue team back. But it was absolutely necessary to get a team where the explosion had occurred. This was the only way the status of the men could be determined. The normal man-way was not an option due to the fire, numerous roof falls and fallen supports. It was decided that entrance would be gained by erecting line brattices (dividing curtains that split a passage into two halves), down a different series of tunnels. One side of the line brattice is used for fresh air, the other for the return air. Men and equipment could then travel down one side as well. This was a slow process. You had to send men with oxygen tanks forward to determine how far it was safe (no fire) to erect line brattice, then actually erect the structure and strengthen or replace damaged support beams and timbers.
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Mine #155, abt 1940
These efforts went on through the night, with men, both local and from out of town, doing what they could for the rescue effort. The women worked to feed the men and to comfort the children, and each other. The first of the downed men, Virgil Clay and Roy Murray were reached in the early hours of July 18th, nearly a day after the explosion occured. By noon of the same day, seven of the men had been located and their bodies moved to the surface. The bodies were transported one by one, wrapped in white sheets, by mine railway cars. The two remaining men, Frank Tuzzy and John Gould, were recovered the next day, from under a heavy roof fall.
The Ashland Daily Independent ran an AP story, by W.F. Arbogst, that quoted John F Daniels, Chief of the State Department of Mine and Minerals saying that the bodies were not crushed. This has to be taken with a grain of salt however. Later on, the same story reports that there were difficulties in "mortifying some of the bodies" due to the burned and crushed condition. The official "Report of Explosion" by Joseph F Davies, says that "Six of the bodies were found under falls" Two of those men, Tuzzy and Gould, required almost another full day to dig out. The report also says that two other men, William Kretzer and Sherley Hereford were "found completely covered with rock". I would think it safe to say that Mr. Daniels was at least mistaken, and possibly doing a bit of damage control. In the end dead is dead, and the exact reason why is small comfort. The men left nine widows and 27 orphans. Only 21 year old Virgil Clay was without offspring.
The bodies of the deceased miners were remanded to the families or undertakers and their funeral services were held. The Kretzer brothers were laid to rest in their family cemetery in Carter County. John Gool and Virgil Clay would never leave Van Lear again. Gool is buried near Webb Hollow. Clay is interred in the Richmond Hill Cemetery. Roy Murray's family also had a private graveyard, in Lowmansville. Derwood Litz final resting place is near East Point, KY. Frank Tuzy was buried in Mayo Cemetery, in Paintsville. Sherley Hereford and James Vaughan ended up in Ashland. Mr. Hereford is in the Ashland Cemetery and James Vaughn is buried in the Rose Hill Cemetery.
The Ashland Daily Independent ran an AP story, by W.F. Arbogst, that quoted John F Daniels, Chief of the State Department of Mine and Minerals saying that the bodies were not crushed. This has to be taken with a grain of salt however. Later on, the same story reports that there were difficulties in "mortifying some of the bodies" due to the burned and crushed condition. The official "Report of Explosion" by Joseph F Davies, says that "Six of the bodies were found under falls" Two of those men, Tuzzy and Gould, required almost another full day to dig out. The report also says that two other men, William Kretzer and Sherley Hereford were "found completely covered with rock". I would think it safe to say that Mr. Daniels was at least mistaken, and possibly doing a bit of damage control. In the end dead is dead, and the exact reason why is small comfort. The men left nine widows and 27 orphans. Only 21 year old Virgil Clay was without offspring.
The bodies of the deceased miners were remanded to the families or undertakers and their funeral services were held. The Kretzer brothers were laid to rest in their family cemetery in Carter County. John Gool and Virgil Clay would never leave Van Lear again. Gool is buried near Webb Hollow. Clay is interred in the Richmond Hill Cemetery. Roy Murray's family also had a private graveyard, in Lowmansville. Derwood Litz final resting place is near East Point, KY. Frank Tuzy was buried in Mayo Cemetery, in Paintsville. Sherley Hereford and James Vaughan ended up in Ashland. Mr. Hereford is in the Ashland Cemetery and James Vaughn is buried in the Rose Hill Cemetery.
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Memorial at the Van Lear Museum
The funerals would have ordinarily been the end of the story. But thanks to United Mine Workers Association #5835 Mine Committee Head, and future State Representative, John Mollette, it wasn't.
Mr. Mollette, on July 22, 1935 swore out a murder warrant for John Daniel. John Mollette felt that the Chief of the State Department of Mines and Minerals was directly responsible for the deaths of the nine men. His complaint was that Daniels had failed to force Consolidated Coal Company to provide the prescribed five bosses that should have been inspecting the mines in Van Lear. There had been only one inspector. Mr. Mollette also stated in an interview with Doug Kretzer, that the man who was supposed to check for methane had made a perfunctory inspection, pronounced it good, and went about other business. I have not been able to substantiate this claim, but Mr. Mollette was adamant that the mine had not been adequately inspected. With an explosion that had just happened, and the official report stating as a remedy, better inspection procedures, it is hard to argue the point. Mr. Daniel charged back that Mollette was grandstanding in an attempt to gain publicity for a run at the State Legislature. Regardless of the motives, John Daniel was arrested and put in the Van Lear jail on July 29th. He was subsequently transferred to the county jail in Paintsville. Ordinarily a man of Mr. Daniel's means and position would have been out on bail, in hours. But the arrest happened late enough in the afternoon, so that he had to spend a night in jail. He was bonded out the next day. Over the next several months Governor Ruby Laffoon reviewed the charges and the results of the investigations. He decided to pardon Mr. Daniel, on November 6, 1935, before the murder trial would take place. That ended most of the legal wrangling. Oral family history says that Charles Kretzer's widow, Jamima (Mima) was paid a small sum by Consolidated Coal. She used that money to buy a small piece of land, upstate, in Ashland. It is assumed that the other families were similarly compensated.
It was over, but Van Lear would never be the same. Van Lear had never witnessed a scene like this before. It seemed to cast a pall over the town. Coal prices had been down in recent times and work was sometimes scarce. The coal in Van Lear was now becoming more expensive to mine. The workers that were killed were two miles deep into the mine when the explosion occurred. World War II came and although demand for coal increased as war production geared up, it was not a happy time for anyone. In 1946, with the end of World War II, Consolidated Coal began to sell off its coal mining properties in Van Lear. By 1951, coal mining as an industry, was over for Van Lear.
Mr. Mollette, on July 22, 1935 swore out a murder warrant for John Daniel. John Mollette felt that the Chief of the State Department of Mines and Minerals was directly responsible for the deaths of the nine men. His complaint was that Daniels had failed to force Consolidated Coal Company to provide the prescribed five bosses that should have been inspecting the mines in Van Lear. There had been only one inspector. Mr. Mollette also stated in an interview with Doug Kretzer, that the man who was supposed to check for methane had made a perfunctory inspection, pronounced it good, and went about other business. I have not been able to substantiate this claim, but Mr. Mollette was adamant that the mine had not been adequately inspected. With an explosion that had just happened, and the official report stating as a remedy, better inspection procedures, it is hard to argue the point. Mr. Daniel charged back that Mollette was grandstanding in an attempt to gain publicity for a run at the State Legislature. Regardless of the motives, John Daniel was arrested and put in the Van Lear jail on July 29th. He was subsequently transferred to the county jail in Paintsville. Ordinarily a man of Mr. Daniel's means and position would have been out on bail, in hours. But the arrest happened late enough in the afternoon, so that he had to spend a night in jail. He was bonded out the next day. Over the next several months Governor Ruby Laffoon reviewed the charges and the results of the investigations. He decided to pardon Mr. Daniel, on November 6, 1935, before the murder trial would take place. That ended most of the legal wrangling. Oral family history says that Charles Kretzer's widow, Jamima (Mima) was paid a small sum by Consolidated Coal. She used that money to buy a small piece of land, upstate, in Ashland. It is assumed that the other families were similarly compensated.
It was over, but Van Lear would never be the same. Van Lear had never witnessed a scene like this before. It seemed to cast a pall over the town. Coal prices had been down in recent times and work was sometimes scarce. The coal in Van Lear was now becoming more expensive to mine. The workers that were killed were two miles deep into the mine when the explosion occurred. World War II came and although demand for coal increased as war production geared up, it was not a happy time for anyone. In 1946, with the end of World War II, Consolidated Coal began to sell off its coal mining properties in Van Lear. By 1951, coal mining as an industry, was over for Van Lear.
Sources
Perliminary Report of Explosion Consolidated Mine No. 5-Consolidated Coal Company Van, Lear, Kentucky
by Joseph F. Davies District Engineer
Dept. of the Interior, US Bureau of Mines
Report of Explosion Consolidated Coal Company, Mine No. 155 Van Lear, Johnson County, Kentucky
by Joseph F. Davies District Engineer
Dept. of the Interior, US Bureau of Mines
Unknown " XXXX Post" Newspaper, July 18, 1935
dateline Van Lear, KY: Bodies of 7 Victims of Mine Blast Found
Unknown Newspaper, July 23, 1935
dateline Paintsville, KY: Blaming State Cheif for Mining Blast
Unknown Newspaper, July 29, 1935
dateline Paintsville, KY: Kentucky's Mining Chief is Arrested
Unknown Newspaper, Nov. 6, 1935
dateline Frankfort, KY: Daniel Freed by Pardon
Asscoiated Press story appearing in unknown KY newspaper, July 18/19, 1935
by W.F. Arbogast
Ashland Daily Independent, July 19? 1935
9 Miners Die in Kentucky Mine Blast: 27 Children Fatherless
The Bankmule (The Official Publication of the Van Lear Ky Historical Society)
Vol 2-No 2, July, 1985 including the following articles in the same
Wednesday, July 17, 1935 by Douglas A. Kretzer
Recollections of July 17, 1935 by Bertha Kretzer
The Bankmule (The Official Publication of the Van Lear Ky Historical Society)
Unknown date, likely mid-1980s
John B. Mollette---A Man For All Seasons by J. Knowles
Interview with Ann Kretzer Renfroe, 1994, 2003, & 2006
Interview with Ellen Kretzer McKinight, 1994, 2003, & 2006
Interview with Bill Renfore, 1994, 2003, & 2006
Interview with Tom McKnight, 1994, 2003, & 2006
by Joseph F. Davies District Engineer
Dept. of the Interior, US Bureau of Mines
Report of Explosion Consolidated Coal Company, Mine No. 155 Van Lear, Johnson County, Kentucky
by Joseph F. Davies District Engineer
Dept. of the Interior, US Bureau of Mines
Unknown " XXXX Post" Newspaper, July 18, 1935
dateline Van Lear, KY: Bodies of 7 Victims of Mine Blast Found
Unknown Newspaper, July 23, 1935
dateline Paintsville, KY: Blaming State Cheif for Mining Blast
Unknown Newspaper, July 29, 1935
dateline Paintsville, KY: Kentucky's Mining Chief is Arrested
Unknown Newspaper, Nov. 6, 1935
dateline Frankfort, KY: Daniel Freed by Pardon
Asscoiated Press story appearing in unknown KY newspaper, July 18/19, 1935
by W.F. Arbogast
Ashland Daily Independent, July 19? 1935
9 Miners Die in Kentucky Mine Blast: 27 Children Fatherless
The Bankmule (The Official Publication of the Van Lear Ky Historical Society)
Vol 2-No 2, July, 1985 including the following articles in the same
Wednesday, July 17, 1935 by Douglas A. Kretzer
Recollections of July 17, 1935 by Bertha Kretzer
The Bankmule (The Official Publication of the Van Lear Ky Historical Society)
Unknown date, likely mid-1980s
John B. Mollette---A Man For All Seasons by J. Knowles
Interview with Ann Kretzer Renfroe, 1994, 2003, & 2006
Interview with Ellen Kretzer McKinight, 1994, 2003, & 2006
Interview with Bill Renfore, 1994, 2003, & 2006
Interview with Tom McKnight, 1994, 2003, & 2006